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In recent years new cornplex systems haae been deaeloped in the automotiue f,eld to increase safety and comfort. These systems integrate
h,ardware and, sofiware to guarantee the best results in aehicle handling and mahe products competitite on the market.
Howeuer, the increase in techni,cal dntails and the utilization and i,ntegration of these cornplicated systems require a high' leueL of dyamic
control system reliabitity. In order to intproae this fundamental chnracteristic methods can be extracted from methods wed in the
aeronauti.cal fieLd to dcal uith reliability and these can be integrated into one simplifed method for application in the automotiae feld.
First|y, as a case stud,y, ue decid.ed to analyse VDC (the Vehicle Dyrnmics Control system) by def,ning a possible approach to relinbility
techni.qucs. A VDC Fault Tree Analysis represenh the f.rst step in this actiaiQ: FM enables us to recognize the critical components in all
possible uorking conditioru of a car, inclul,i.ng cranking, during'key-on'-'key-olf'phnses, wh.ich is particular\ cfiticalfor the electrical
on-board system (because of u oltage reduction).
By associating FA (Functional Arnlysis) and FTA results uith a good FFA (Funnti,onal Failure Ana\sis), it is possible to define the best
architecture for the general system to achieae the aim of a htgh reliability structure.
Th,e paper uill shou some preliminary results from the application of this methodologl, taken from uariow typical handling conditions from
uell establisfud test procedures for aehicles.
Ke",worik: safety, systems reliability, fault tree anallsis (FTA), functional analysis (FA), handling, uhicle dynamic control (VDC)
1 Introduction
Automobiles and land vehicles in general have seen a
dramatic increase in complexity in recent years. Today's auto-
mobile presents a higher than evel and increasing, number
of value-added features, many of which are controlled by the
vehicle's electrical and electronic (E/E) system. In fact, a vehi-
cle today has approximately twice as many E/E functions as
one producedjust l0years ago. This rend requires electrical
system designs that pmvide both increased functionality and
increased reliability. This inflation effect has been caused
mainly by two factors: the hrst is rising demands from the
consumer. This has not only manifested itself through the de-
sire for better performance or comfort, but also stems from
increased awareness of safety related issues and more protec-
tion for the occupants of the vehicle. The second factor has
been the development of various electronic techniques and
equipment. This technology has pushed the limits imposed
by the on-board systems and, specifically, has allowed the im-
plementation of many functions controlled by hardware and
software systems on board.
It is common practice when buying a car nowadays to find
under the hood and scattered throughout the vehicle kilo-
metres and kilometres of cables and wires, multiple control
boxes and an equally high number of sensors picking up
a very wide range of physical parameters. On top of this, all
the electronic systems on board a car are interfaced in some
way or another with themechanical and hydraulic systems.
An example of typical functions now under the control or
assistance of electronics is the control function. This aflects
the ride and the handling performance, above all else. When
the driver makes a sudden manoeuvre, control is critical. It is
just as essential in bad weather or on rough roads, especially
on unpredictable road surfaces. Even under normal condi-
tions, on straightroads and turns, or during braking and
acceleration, control determines the ride and handling per-
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formance. Often, the level of control depends on the skill of
the driver. The ride and handling technologies emerging in
the industry help offer significantly more control for every
driver in every situation, regardless of skill []. Howeve4 all
this comes with a price tag. l1lis is not only in terms of the
final price for the use4 but also in terms of increased design
complexity that places heavier loads on the design engineers
and extends the time to prototype and testing. This is a key
point that has been taken as a key driver in our methodology.
Later we will uncover how integrating the different analyses
in an intelligent way can provide a way to develop prelimi-
nary estimates early in the development. In this context
the complex system identified has to be intended as the
ensemble of subsystems in a vehicle integrating different
and advanced functions. To give a brief idea, the list of
various state-of-the-art technologies applied might include :
Higher- and multiple-voltage power generation and storage,
Networked communications (multiplexing), Fiber-optic
communications, Multi-drop wiring, Networked control-
lers with distributed computing, standard interfaces, and
mechatronics (electronics integrated into switches, connec-
tors, sensors, and actuators). Fig. 1 shows a generic vehicle
encompassing a set of advanced circuitries and components.
Tirrning to the aerospace field, we can see how avionics [5]
has been a relevant part of the development of an airplane
since the Iate 1940s. It has since developed into a variety of
lesser streams, covering the most various functions on an air-
plane: communications, navigations, control, etc. It still is at a
level of complexity much higher than that of a car, but several
system are comparable in terms of functions and criticalities.
Since some of the electronics mounted on a vehicle oversee
safety, and the development of some specific aspects can be
derived from analogous activities from the aerospace indus-
try. In particular we would like to point out here how evolu-
tiorr in avionics design has shifted with hardware miniaturiza-
tion and the concomitant architectural integration strategies
t2l.
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Fig. l: Modern vehicle circuitry schematics (Courtesy of Delphi Automotive Systems)
In its basic form, an aircraft avionics system can be viewed
as a large number of interconnected computers. Up to the
1980s there would be about ten computers, going up around
30 for bigger airplanes. The capabilities developed over
recent years have allowed a switch from these so called feder-
ated architectures to a system integration aPproach. Basically,
that functions can be mapped onto hardware as integrated
computer nodes. The base line for an avionics architecture
can be represented as in Frg. 2. This can be taken as a starting
point for an analysis that will lead us to transition develop-
ment methodologies aimed at taking the higher reliability
levels achieved in aerospace into the automotive field.
Aside flom the specific architecture, which is not under
discussion in this work, we have recognized how some typical
methodologies have been applied in, in a slightly diflerent
way the aerospace field than in the automotive field. In partic-
ular, well known analyses like EA (Functional Analysis), Fault
Tiee Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
(FMEA) [9], have all been used extensively and have under-
gone improvements [6], [7]. Most significantly, however they
are all inserted in a well structured methodology that allows
results and trade information to be gathered from the very be-
ginning, so that the overall results can be evaluated. A major
advantage ofthis approach is the integration ofall the analy-
ses, both horizontally and as vertically over the different levels
of definition from equipment up to system level. It is not
necessary to recollect and reframe the results since the analy-
sis are all interlaced among them and they are evolved from
common standpoints.
At this point it is thus clear how this operational way can
be exported to the automotive sector lvith great advantage in
terms of development and overall reliability.
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Fig. 2: Typical bus configuration for elementary on board avionics [3]
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2 Study scheme
Starting from the background illustrated in the previous
paragraph, we have identified the main target of our study
as the.definition of a general methodology to suppor-r, as
an ancillary analysis, the development of the design bf auto_
motive systems complex. This will essentially be aimed at
reaching a consistent level of reliability and safety. These
are features intended for a generic system encompassing
electro-mechanical components and containing consistent
software functions. Our purpose has been to deielop a true
methodology. Though not as cornplex as others jvailable
in the literature [4], it will have the great advanrage of being
exfemely lean and widely applicable. One of the main fea_
turcs is the possibility, which we intend to make use of, to
apply it from the very beginning of the design, accompanying
all the phases of the developmenr of the project. Mo.eoverl
our intention has been to define in an objective way, the
requirements necessary to develop all the relited subsystems
as well as the embedded softrvare. All of the above will rake
into account the targets established at the beginning of the
project.
- 
For the time being the main developmental and test
benchmarks come from the automotive industry. That is
to that say some requirements have been extracted directly
fiom the set of initial requirements and quality levels of the
automotive industry. The purpose is to obtain significant
reliability data well before the resrs are launched, and in this
way to identify the critical issues and act to corect them.
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Fig. 3 shows the overall logic driving the study. The frame-
work within which we have moved is given by the basic idea of
integrating from the very beginning all the analyses and activ_
ities carried out, in parallel as much as possible, for both
hardware and software [10]. It is essential that the developers
of the software are fully aware of what is taking place on
the hardware side, and vice versa. Running all the ictivities
in parallel allows us to evaluate the impact on the diflerent
functions early in the project. As we can see from the figure,
several cross checks are carried out during the developirent
of the design. These are not intended aJ formal gates, but
rather as check points for assessing the coherenidevelop-
ment and exchange of information. The main drivers arc
the reliability and safety requirements. They are pursued all
along,-and.each analysis is aimed at implemenring, verifiing
then checking compliance with the target values. The anayl
sis, as shown in Fig. 3, cascades from functional down to the
control loop, through fault trees, and then back to reassess the
progress, and integrate the results from downstream. The naro
plans, green and red for SW and HW, always move in tight
parallel, maximizing the interchange.
3 Specific problem application
We now introduce the system we have chosen as a case
study for the application of our methodology. Speaking in
general terms, we can call Vehicle Dynamics Control Sysiem(\rDC) ageneric system aiming at increasing the level of safety
during the operations of a common vehicll. The main func_
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tion is to control the dynamic behaviour of the vehicle, inter-
vening especially whenever the vehicle is approaching, the
limits of its usage envelope. As a first approach we see the ac-
tion as being carried out by acting on the brakes and simulta-
neously controlling the torque produced by the engine.
Typically, a \rDC includes functions related to the control
of the braking actions (EBD), functions avoiding locking of
brakes during the braking action (ABS), the traction control
system [ICS), and a function controiling the release of torque
in acceleration (ASR), and others. Each of the functions listed
above encases several aspects and is carried out by Processing
various quantities. As an example we can point out here that
an ABS function has to control the various degrees of longitu-
dinal variation of attrition according to the different motion
conditions. While making a turn, both longitudinal and lat-
eral forres act on the vehicle, and also an additional function
is called in, Cornering Brake Control (CBC), which takes into
account the different load exprcssed by the internal and
external wheels on the ground.
The VDC is a very complex system. lt is normally made
up of a number of electro-hydraulic-mechanical components'
Typically we have up to twelve two-lvay valves coupled to
the limiting components, pumps, and actuators. In order to
better analyse this part of the system, a dedicated action has
been devoted to modeling all the hydraulic components.
This modeling is essential in order to advance the knowl-
edge of the system and so move on from an a priori logic
to a rcsponsive system which acts according to the real
vehicle-ground interaction and the conditions encountetcd
while operating. Once again we would like to underline the
importance of integrating the knowledge related to the soft-
ware running the system with the physical definition of the
system itself, especia\ the electro-hydraulic portion of it.
From our point ofview it is useless to investigate the physical
functionalities of the system without a substantial verification
of the data transmissions logics. Hence the use of several
commercial software packages for testing the data buses and
data interchange.
Assuming now that we want to develop a system similar to
VDC, the flrst step is to think out the overall structure of the
system. After all the main functions are identified and a thor-
ough description has been made the next step is to start doing
the prcliminary design.
Therc are several ways of doing this; to maximizing the
implementation of reliability and safety featules fiom the verT
beginning [8], a potential development scheme is shorvn
in Fig. 4.
Logical scheme
The starting point is represented by a Functional analysis:
a ta{get function is defined, then a detailed representation of
a breakdown of all the sub-functions. In this phase experts
from different fields (mechanics, electronics, electrical, etc.)
work together to evaluate every single function necessary to
comply with the required target. when all functions are clearly
identified, is possible to analyse the components implement-
ing that function from both the hardware and software point
of view.
In practical terms the theoretical structure derived from
the Functional Analysis becomes a physical structure inwhich
we can see every single element making up the general
system.
At this point, a Fault Tiee Analysis can be applied to the
obtained scheme and verified with a control loop if the re-
quirernents are satisfied in the case of failure of various
components.
The control loop is basically a series of logical steps taken
by the system engineer aimed at assessing the consequent-
iality of all the functions and the full satisfaction through the
dedicated hardware. Since the procedure has not yet been
formalized, check lists are being prcpared in a generalized
rvay and will be tested as more analyses are carried out on
differ.ent subsystems.
It is important to underline that it is also possible to veri$
through the control loop whether all fundamental functions
have been correctly identified during the functional analysis
step. At the end ofthis processwe have a general system archi-
tecture fiom the point ofview of theoretical requirements and
from the point ofview ofboth physical hardware and software
elements.
As the project design unfolds, thorough adherence to the
scheme assures the safety and reliability allocations can be
controlled in real time.
In particular, the fault tree analysis results (see Fig. 5) can
be used to check the failure rate target of each component,
and so it is out relatively easy tb evaluate the trade offs and
par-t substitutions to raise the overall system reliability.
Reliabilitv data is nowadays widely used in every engi-
neering field. MIL-HDBK 217 and RAC are nvo of the
most widely used documents containing collections of failure
rates and other data for various components. Several specific
databases have also been built throughout the years to
support design choices in the field ofaerospace' In the auto-
rnotive field these databases are not yet fully developed to the
salne extent,
Physical scheme
Analysis of the component to realise
required functions
Fig. 4: Development scheme for a VDCJike system
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Fig. 5: VDC Fault Tree Analysis
Fig. 6: Reliability data building and managemenr philosophy
Fig. 6 shows a typical basic policy to enhance this situation.
As an ancillary activiry to this study the procedure shown has
been partially implemented. In particular the work has been
focused on increasing the data yield from subcontractors and
suppliers. As far as we have seen till now, the data collection
and management activities are carried out on the nvo differ-
ent planes in two not completely compatibleways. It happens
that the data relevant to the overall production is not neces-
sarily the data that is sensitive to the equipment manufac-
turer. This causes biased collection, and subsequently data
transmission.
Due to all of the above it is sometimes very hard to
conectly evaluate the overall reliability of a complex system.
In the course of the study an alternative strategy, coping with
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the lack of data, has been evaluated. Starting from the reli-
ability data available, a corrective factor PM (Proceeding Mu-
tation) is generated through a series 6f 2nalyses aimed at cou-
pling the aeronautical components (i.e., sensors) and the au-
tomotive components.
Through the correct application of this factor to aeronau-
tical data, estimated values can be obtained for automotive el-
ements and an approximate failure rate of these values can be
calculated.
While the appropriate databases are being expanded and
refined, a temporary collection of all the PM f,actors devised
will be used and updated, constantly crossing the values with
the results obtained from experimental tests.
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4 Identification of the problem
Ti,vo main problems have been identified in the course of
our work. They are diverse in nature, and can be solved
immediately: firstly, there is the need to identiS, a methodol-
ogy that will help, by means of graphical support, in correctly
identifring the physical structure of the system being ana-
lysed. To this purpose we have looked at FA, which requires
a functional description of the system, and FMEA, usually
carried out to a more thorough level of detail and spe-
cific descriptions. Hence we will start out from the formel
describe the main objectives that our system architecture has
to comply with, and then move on to the latter to analyse the
different components, their I'eatures and the potential failure
modes. In doing this the two methodologies come together
for whole and also work as a reciprocal verification.
The second main point we stated is that all too often the
analyses from the sofnvare and hardware components are
carried out separately. In thisway the data gathered from the
two sides, even though formally correct and complete, are
not structurally integrated, and so information regarding the
interactions is lost.
To repair this fault a method [4] has been developed,
called Hierarchically performed Hazard Origin and Propaga-
tion Studies or Hip-Hops. These techniques are founded on
the principle that all the existing methodologies function
well, but need a higher degree of integration to suitably fit
the most modern complex systems. The work evolves through
integrating of several analyses, with the main purpose of
maximizing the automation of the procedures through the
development of appropriate tools and soffivare.
5 Fault injection techniques
In order to achieve a more complete reliability analysis,
it is deemed useful to analyse system reactions to hardware
and software failures. The technique explained in this work,
through fault injections, has proven to be cost effective and
capable of providing valuable results. Using software tools
like Amesim or.Matlab Simulink, it is possible to develop soft-
ware models to obtain a very close simulation of real events
without the use of prototypes; in particula4 it is possible
to sirnulate the mathematical logic (Simulink) and physical
elements (Amesim) of a generic electro-mechanical system.
Analysing the mathematical equation and the logic which
control the phenomena (Iig.7 shows the traction control
logic), it is possible to simulate a failure in the virtual model,
using results from FTA and FA to isolate the most critical
componenrs.
In this way we can study the behaviour of the system
in critical conditions and evaluate whether the general re-
sponse is sufficient to guarantee the minimum safety value.
In addition to this, using simulation techniques starting fiom
hardwarc and software integrated FTA and FA analysis a large
number of results can be obtained in a short period of time,
and the correctnessof the project design can be evaluated
before the construction of the physical system (i.e., the first
prototypes). Fig. 8 shows the Simulink implemented scheme
for fault injection. As an example in order to better under-
stand the process, we can take a failure in the data transmis-
sion system. After injecting a generic or specific error in the
transmission protocol, or the hardware implementing it, we
evaluate the consequences, comparing the actual output with
Vehicle State Information
B;tke
Torques
Control
Compensator
-
Brake
Torques
Fig. 7: Traction Control System operational logic
Fig. 8: Simulink scheme for fault injection techniques
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the set of expected values. The consequences, both over a
short period and over a long period are then evaluated. A
wrong sigrial can be either a lack of information or a set of
inconsistent bits. A preliminary result of this analysis is the
establishment of the so-called safe operational time. This rep-
resents the minimum elapsed time during which the system,
thanks to its robust design and reliability, can sdll operare
within the safety limits. Later the analysis provides data about
the period of latency and the reboot of the sysrem.
6 Conclusion and recommendations
Our work has presented the preiiminary results and the
overall methodological approach to the problem of designing
reliability and safety in automotive systems since the very
beginning of the developmenr. None of the component anal-
yses used are brand new or innovative in themselves. That
was not the purpose of the work. Nevertheless, the overall
approach has been viewed as innovarive and valuable in the
automotive world, where interconnections between the difler-
ent analyses and also between software and hardware, func-
tional and physical analysis, are still parrially lacking, at least
in comparison with the aerospace environment. We have also
seen how other researchers, all ofthem producing outstand-
ing and valuable results, have travelled this road. What is dif-
ferent in this structured method is the leaner approach, aim-
ing at applying just the minimum analysis required at the
right time in the developmenr, avoiding massive efforts for
preliminary design. We have also highlighted how ro ler the
software and hardware sides talk rogether right from the be-
ginning in order to ensure that the development of the func-
tions is correctly transformed into code and the hardware im-
plementation evolves at the same pace.
The fault injection technique has also proven its effective-
ness in supporting the assessment of the system performance
in the earlier design phases. The key point is to accurarely
select the events to generate and support the simulations
adequately, especially for those failures not 
€asily reproduc-
ible on track.
The main advantage of applying this methodology is that
is avoid common pitfalls and mistakes, especially in rhe earli-
est phases of the design, without overburdening the system
with cumbersome procedures.
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